Meet Andrei Illarionov, a proponent of Western liberalism and democracy in Russia. From 1993 to 1994, he served as chief economic adviser to the prime minister of the Russian Federation, Viktor Chernomyrdin. He resigned in February 1994 to protest changes in the government's economic policy.
In July 1994 Illarionov founded the Institute of Economic Analysis, a platform from which Illarionov popularized his strong positions favoring free-trade and rule of law. Putin noticed. Putin needed a few erstwhile economic liberals to keep democracy-watchers off his back. He brought Illarionov into his cabinet, thus neutralizing a potential source of opposition.
Days after his inauguration, Putin's economic advisor, Andrei Illarionov, discovered that Putin had signed a decree consolidating 70 percent of the country's alcohol manufacturers into a single company to be managed by Putin's close St. Petersburg friend. None of the new liberal economic advisors had been consulted or informed. Illarionov tried to ignore what would soon become a Putin pattern-- paying lip service to his economic advisors while "consistently broadsiding them with decisions that consolidated all of the country's resources in the hands of his cronies" (See Gessen, 259).
From 2000-2005, Illarionov served as key economic advisor to President Putin, where he regularly paid lip service to the pro-globalization agenda. To his credit, Illarionov has consistently argued for the rule of law and free global trade markets. As a senior advisor to Russian President Putin, Illarionov was outspoken against Russia's ratification of Kyoto. (In 2004, Putin ratified the Kyoto Protocol anyway.)
In 2006, Illarionov was appointed senior researcher of the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity in Washington, DC. In this position, he has lamented Russia's new corporate state in which state-owned enterprises are governed by personal interests and private corporations have become subject to arbitrary intervention to serve state interests as well as new ways in which political, economic and civil liberties are being eliminated. Illarionov is one of the 34 first signatories of the online anti-Putin manifesto Putin must go, published on March 10, 2010.
In May 2008 Cato Unbound blog discussion, he maintained that "the resource curse" was not more extraordinary than other forms of market capture by corrupt governments and officials. He argued that "the precedent of treating a country’s natural resources as belonging to its people is the problem, not the beginning of a solution." Illarianov argued that the idea of collective national ownership of resources resulted in nationalization, a form of economic control by political elites. His view is summarized as follows:
Illarionov argues that the trade sanctions Wenar proposes would punish innocent citizens who already suffer under corrupt rulers. The issue, he argues, is not a matter of what is stolen, but how we will treat those responsible for theft.
In 2010, Illarionov received money to speak at the Heartland Institute's anti-climate change extravaganza, the Fourth International Conference on Climate Change, a mecca for policymakers and extractivists hoping to roll back environmental regulations that hold companies responsible for their environmental footprints. He also held forth against the increasing illiberalization of Putin's Russia, who many knew to be supporting nationalist, irredentist candidates in Hungary and other European states.
Illarionov was one of the 34 first signatories of the online anti-Putin manifesto Putin must go, published on March 10, 2010. Over the years, after Gessen's book went to press in 2012 and while Trump's son-in-law extended family business connections in Russia, Illarionov continued to warn about Putin.
He critiqued Putin's "mafia-style" policies in a a prescient 2015 interview:
Putin’s ultimate goal is clear – it is to change the world according to his vision. It is a vision of the Sicilian world, a world that is ruled by the mighty and the powerful. It is a world in which such documents as the Helsinki Final Act or the UN Charter do not matter or simply do not exist. In such a world, borders can be violated under any pretext or without any pretext. The economic system is based on mafia-style relations.
When pushed on Putin's popular support and masses of Russian fans, Illarionov drew a distinction that should concern students of liberty:
We need to be careful when speaking about opinion polls in hard authoritarian regimes or semi-totalitarian ones like we have in. It is difficult to trust these numbers. No semi-totalitarian regime can produce a real reflection on what people really think. Even if we believe these numbers for a moment, we need to make the distinction between the level of support for Putin before Crimea and after. Before, the level of support for Putin was around 45 per cent. After, it was 85 per cent.
These numbers mean that around 45 per cent of the Russian society accepts the Sicilian way of rule within the country while 85 per cent express support for the imperial external policy. The Sicilian model by itself is not imperialist. It is a model based on the way people do business, but mostly within existing borders. Hence, Putin’s increase in support is not for mafia-like rule, but for imperialism and the imperial syndrome in Russia has not yet been healed.
I quote extensively because Illarionov's remarks provide insight into the rise of white nationalism across Europe as well as its current sweep of the US political system. The interviewer notes that, "especially after the war in Ukraine, many people realised that what Putin is doing is bad". Media, policy-wonks, academics, and scholars took Putin to task publicly for his repudiation of the rule and law and slide into autocracy. The interviewer wants to know why, despite the West's knowledge of Putin's corruption and increasing dictatorship, nothing was being done to stop it.
Illarionov replied:
The West is divided. The US itself is divided, the EU of course as well. There are still many allies of Putin in the West. There is a long list of “Putintern” members: Gerhard Schröder, Silvio Berlusconi, Vaclav Klaus, Marine Le Pen and others. They are also among journalists and think-tanks throughout the world. Putin has many friends.
Unlike communism, which was rather alien to European culture even if it had some roots in European history, the Putin’s Sicilian way of rule is much more familiar to Europe and closer to the European heart. It is also a reason why it is so hard to fight it.
The Sicilian mafia has not yet been taken down. It is very much alive in Italy. We see very similar types of behaviour in many other European states like Greece, Bulgaria or Hungary. Even in the Baltic states there are elements of this attitude. This type of behaviour is associated not only Russians or the Russian psyche. Yes, some Russians behave this way, but it is not exclusively a Russian problem. Look at Croats or Serbs. It is in fact deeply rooted in European human nature. Fortunately for Western Europe, it is already not a dominant part there. The success of Western European states was possible largely thanks to the fact that this side of their nature has been suppressed.
He insisted that economic policy alone would do nothing to halt Putin's take-over of Russian democracy:
It is definitely not enough to apply economic means in order to bring change. It is about having a long-term strategy with a final goal – to make Russia free, democratic and peaceful within internationally recognised borders. This should be now the strategic task for the international community. If one wants to secure peace in Europe and the world, we need to have a different Russia.
But as long as this regime lasts in Russia, in the Kremlin, it poses threat to everybody. As soon as it is changed, and that will not happen overnight, Russia will eventually come to mutually acceptable terms with the rest of the world.
When asked about possible opposition or liberal alternatives to Putin, Illarionov was at a loss. He ended the interview with a shrug.
In late 2016, intelligence sources on Russia noted that Trump advisors met with Igor Sechin, director of Rosneftgas:
In terms of the Substance of Their Discussions, SECHIN’s associate Said That the Rosneftgas president WAS SO Keen to lift personal and corporate western Sanctions Imposed on the Company About enterprise, That he offered PAGE / TRUMP’s associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent (privatised) stake in Rosneft in return. PAGE has expressed interest and confirmed that were TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted.
On January 20, 2017, Russian media reported that Putin allowed “Rosneftegas”, whose board of directors is headed by the executive director of “Rosneft” Igor Sechin, not to disclose their financial performance. On account of the company could accumulate more than 600 billion rubles. These intelligence reports are currently in the hands of US senators and representatives. Obama's sanctions on Putin were rooted in very real and serious allegations of bribery and national security threat. Putin has unimpeachable leverage to keep an America First Trump administration silent on his invasions of neighboring states and democracies.
Just this past week, Paul Goble referenced Illarionov's statements in an interview with Kyiv’s Apostrophe portal:
Russian commentator Andrey Illarionov says that “Belarus is candidate number one for a Russian invasion,” a conclusion that takes on added weight given that the Kremlin is likely to view anti-Lukashenka protests as a cover for such actions just as it did earlier in Ukraine...
“No state in Europe can be completely isolated from possible aggression of an informational, corruption, propagandistic, espionage or hybrid character,” Illarionov says; but “as far as its conventional [form] is concerned, Belarus at present is candidate number one."
Moreover, the likelihood that Putin will now decide on an invasion is likely increased by one aspect of the situation in Minsk that recalls Kyiv in 2013 and that is more frightening to the Kremlin leader than almost any other. The mass protest was not organized by the traditional opposition parties but was spontaneous from below and thus political in a new way.
That point has been made by two Belarusian outlets (Belarus Partisan and Naviy), and Moscow is likely to view this protest not as just the latest in a long line of Belarusian discontent but as something fundamentally new and threatening.
If that is the case, Putin is likely to move against Belarus in the coming days, especially if there are no clear signals from the West that such a move would make absolutely impossible any cooperation with Russia in the foreseeable future.
And here we are, with Putin having deflected international criticism of his Ukranian invasion.
The election of Trump has shored up Putin's image as a strong world leader-- an image threatened by the white flag protest in Russia. And what better way to ensure power than to invest in the disruption of autocracy's chief enemy, a free democratic and liberal America? How the world's greatest voice for freedom became a pawn in Putin's power politics is a story we won't tell our children. Certainly not at Thanksgiving where almost every mirror in Alabama and the red states reveals a turkey.
Trump's election failed Americans. But it also failed struggling democracies who relied on on our moral authority and the threat of possible sanctions to restrain behavior on the international stage.
Given the absence of competing assurances or alternatives, Russians can tell themselves autocracy is the future and their leader is in control. A major player in world events. A puppet-master behind the curtains. The only question is whether congressional Republicans and theocrats will place their commitment to the rule of law over their desperation to maintain access to the orange emperor's court. What we've seen so far is not encouraging.
Cited: Masha Gessen, The Man Without A Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (Riverhead Books: New York, 2012). Additional sources include this PRI podcast.